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At the heart of the notion of an ethical foreign policy is the assumption that foreign policy can help deliver 
liberty and security around the globe. Yet, as Conor Gearty has argued, in our contemporary ‘neo-
democratic’ world, liberty and security are not the universal goods they are often considered to be. Rather 
they are selectively granted, and curtailed for those considered a threat to the status quo. Where liberty 
and security are curtailed, this is often in the name of the universal freedoms that neo-democracies claim 
to uphold. When the Blair government was elected in 1997, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook announced that 
British foreign policy must have an ethical dimension. There has been much debate on whether UK foreign 
policy under the Blair government can be argued to have been ‘ethical’. The focus of debate has tended to 
be the UK’s military interventions. Far less attention has been paid to the direct role played by UK 
authorities, through its intelligence services, in human rights violations under the New Labour and 
subsequent Coalition governments. This paper seeks to further the debate on the ethics of UK foreign 
policy since 1997. It does so by offering a detailed account of the UK’s involvement in the CIA’s rendition 
programme, and shows that the UK was far more involved in rendition and secret detention between 2001 
and 2010 than was previously assumed.  Threaded through the analysis is an account of the various 
measures taken by the New Labour subsequent Coalition governments to suppress the evidence of UK 
involvement. We conclude by offering some reflections on the role human rights organisations, litigators, 
and investigative journalists are increasingly playing in defending the universalism of rights, for publics that 







Shortly after Tony Blair’s government was voted into office in May 1997, the new Foreign Secretary, Robin 
Cook, announced that British foreign policy ‘must have an ethical dimension’.1 He stated, ‘We are instant 
witness in our sitting rooms through the medium of television to human tragedy in distant lands, and are 
therefore obliged to accept moral responsibility for our response.’2 Such rhetoric was invoked to justify the 
various subsequent military interventions undertaken by the two Blair governments (1997-2001 and 2001-
2007).3 The degree to which UK foreign policy under the Blair government can be argued to have been 
‘ethical’ and motivated by human suffering has been widely debated. The focus of debate has tended to be 
the UK’s military interventions, especially in light of the controversy surrounding the 2003 invasion of Iraq, 
and the emergent norm of states having a ‘responsibility to protect’.4  
 
Far less attention has been paid to the direct role played by UK authorities, through its intelligence services, 
in human rights violations under the New Labour and subsequent Coalition governments. When Cook 
argued in 1997 that human rights would be ‘at the heart of our foreign policy’,5 he seemed to have in mind 
warring, repressed and suffering nations overseas, rather than individuals with whom the UK’s intelligence 
services would be dealing. But in evaluating the ethics of the foreign policies of recent UK governments, the 
time is now ripe to consider their record in dealing with individuals considered a threat to UK national 
security. Publicly, following 9/11, the defence of human rights was declared a crucial weapon in the fight 
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 against terrorism. For example, on 25 March 2002, in a speech at the Foreign Policy Centre, UK Foreign 
Secretary Jack Straw declared, ‘Our national interests are served where human rights, democracy and the 
rule of law prevail. Where these are threatened our well-being is at risk.’6 We now know that in secret, in 
the years following 9/11, scores of individuals were kidnapped, illicitly and arbitrarily detained, and 
tortured, as part of the CIA’s programme for the rendition, secret detention and torture of terror suspects.7  
 
Until recently, the UK’s role in the global rendition system has been shrouded in considerable secrecy. 
Certainly very little was known when scholars were beginning to critique the military interventions in 
Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. Through the painstaking work of investigative journalists, human 
rights investigators and litigators, and a small number of scholars, sufficient evidence has now come to light 
to enable a meaningful and detailed account of the UK’s role in the global rendition programme. This paper 
therefore seeks to further the debate on the ethics of UK foreign policy since 1997. It does so by 
considering the role that the UK’s intelligence services played in the rendition programme. In this sense, the 
paper is intended to update earlier work that evaluated the degree to which the UK was complicit in the 
torture of terror suspects.8  
 
The paper begins by offering a brief account of an argument made by Conor Gearty,9 which helps explain 
the disconnection between the UK’s rhetoric on human rights and freedom, and its treatment of terror 
suspects. The assumption underpinning our analysis is that the liberty and security promised by an ‘ethical 
foreign policy’ are far from universal goods. Rather, as Gearty has argued, in our contemporary ‘neo-
democratic world’, they are selectively granted and curtailed for those considered a threat to the status 
quo. Ironically, where liberty and security are curtailed, this is often justified with reference to the universal 
freedoms that neo-democracies claim to uphold.10 The paper then offers a detailed account of the UK’s 
involvement in the rendition programme, and shows that the UK was far more involved in rendition and 
secret detention between 2001 and 2010 than was previously assumed, and as such, was facilitating 
torture in ways not previously understood. UK involvement included: allowing UK airports and airspace to 
be used extensively by renditions aircraft; allowing UK territory to be used for the refuelling of aircraft 
involved in renditions; the initiation by UK authorities of  renditions of individuals to Libya, which were then 
facilitated by the CIA and resulted in the arbitrary detention and torture of victims by Gaddafi’s regime; the 
passing of questions by UK authorities to those involved in interrogations of individuals that have been 
subjected to rendition, secret detention and torture; the receipt by UK authorities of intelligence obtained 
during the interrogation of individuals that have been subjected to rendition, secret detention and torture; 
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 and the failure of UK intelligence agencies to act when they have been informed by prisoners that they 
have been subjected to torture. Threaded through the analysis is an account of the various measures taken 
by the New Labour governments and the subsequent Coalition government to suppress the evidence of UK 
involvement.  
 
Neo-democracy and the erosion of universal human rights 
 
Since the terror attacks of 9/11, we have witnessed the extreme curtailment of the freedoms of thousands 
of individuals suspected, often on flimsy grounds, of having connections to terrorism. In the most serious 
cases, we have learned of their kidnap, arbitrary and illicit detention without trial, and torture, discussed 
below. In his work, Liberty and Security,11 Conor Gearty argues that the global fight against terrorism has 
played a significant role in halting the expansionist trend of universal liberty and democracy. We now ‘drift 
away from democratic fundamentals and back towards elite readings of liberty and security’,12 so that 
these terms no longer retain their ‘ostentatiously universal’ qualities. Rather, these words ‘hide inequality 
and unfairness by seeming to reach all when in fact in their practical impact they are tailored to the few’.13 
Those elite readings of liberty and security, Gearty argues, have their origins in the democratic impulse of 
the Enlightenment. He argues that this impulse was ‘grafted onto earlier unjust systems’14 the result of 
which was that democratic society was constructed as a compromise between power and the people. Elites 
would always only concede liberty provided their own wealth and power was not threatened. The majority 
were content with this, since they were free to pursue individualistic desires. But those wishing to radically 
alter the structures of power would be met with oppression.15  
 
This can help explain why the ‘responsibility to protect’ norm is invoked so readily to justify overseas 
interventions, based on the assumption that they are intended to thwart large scale suffering. Meanwhile, 
the very same states, espousing such humanitarian rhetoric, are also complicit in highly secretive actions 
that violate fundamental rights, such as the right not to be tortured or arbitrarily detained without charge 
or trial. Gearty documents numerous ways in which fundamental freedoms have been eroded for the 
suspect, and not insignificant, minority. As well as extraordinary rendition and prolonged illicit detention, 
Gearty cites the following: extra-judicial and extra-territorial killings of Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-
Awlaki by US forces; interceptions of emails and telephone calls without warrants in the US; detention 
without arrest for extended periods in the US and UK; subjecting individuals in the UK to stringent control 
orders without charging or trying them for any crime; and stripping foreign nationals detained by US and 
allied forces of their habeas corpus rights and their prisoner of war status under the Geneva Conventions.16 
The claim that is repeatedly invoked to justify these violations of basic rights under International Human 
Rights Law, and International Humanitarian Law, as Richard Jackson has shown in some detail with 
reference to the speeches of key officials in the Bush and Blair governments,17 is that the minority 
subjected to these present a dangerous and existential threat to those values we hold most dear in the 
West; liberty, democracy, and security.  
 
Furthermore, the rhetoric of these states now calls into question the degree to which universal respect for 
democracy, the rule of law and human rights can meet contemporary security challenges.18 This was 
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 articulated by President Bush in a press conference on 15 September 2006, as his proposed Military 
Commissions Act was being debated in the Congress and Senate. The Military Commissions Act was a 
response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in June 2006, in Hamdan v Rumsfeld. The Supreme Court rule that it 
was unlawful to deny habeas corpus rights to Guantánamo prisoners, and that the Geneva Conventions 
should apply to them. During Bush’s press interview, he described Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions, which he stated prohibits ‘outrages on human dignity’ as ‘vague’. He argued that the Military 
Commissions Act would provide much more clarity on what US armed forces could be permitted to do, 
than the Geneva Conventions do.19 Bush both misquotes Common Article 3, (it refers to outrages upon 
personal dignity) and omits the important clarifications that the Article contains on what exactly is 
prohibited. It reads:  
 
the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect 
to the above-mentioned persons: (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of 
executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the 
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.20 
 
Common Article 3 clearly prohibits the types of treatment that we now know the Bush administration 
sanctioned for prisoners held in its rendition and detention programme; they did amount to cruel 
treatment, torture, and humiliating and degrading treatment. We can see, why, therefore, Bush was quick 
to dismiss the relevance of Common Article 3. Unfortunately, the effect of repeated claims by senior state 
representatives about the existential threat posed by the terrorists, and the inadequacy of international 
legal systems to address that current threat, all feeds into the erosion of the universality of democracy, the 
rule of law and human rights, and contributes to the passive acceptance by frightened or misled publics 
about what is at stake. As Gearty argues, ‘those of us fortunate enough to enjoy liberty in fact as well as 
theory seem to see enemies everywhere and appear quite prepared to truncate their liberty while 
contriving to continue to believe not only in our own freedom but in liberty as a universal value’.21 It is in 
this context that the UK was able to join the US in supporting, condoning and carrying out actions that 
violate international law as part of the fight against terrorism, and in which the UK authorities repeatedly 
denied involvement and sought to halt full investigation into its role.  
 
Britain’s role in the Global Rendition System 
 
UK authorities were not formally confronted with allegations of complicity in the CIA’s global rendition 
programme until 2005, when evidence first emerged that UK airports had been stop-off points for a series 
of private jets that had been contracted through a series of ‘shell companies’ that the CIA was using to 
undertake rendition operations. Investigations during 2004 and 2005 by the Washington Post 22and the 
New York Times23 blew the cover on a set of companies which appeared to exist only on paper, and which 
acted as a front for CIA activity to go unnoticed. These 'shell companies' hid between 25-30 aircraft owned 
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 by the CIA, some of which were heavily involved in the rendition programme. Alongside this facade of 
independent aircraft operations, a significant part of the CIA’s rendition programme was genuinely 
outsourced to a network of private companies. Between them, these companies provided the aircraft and 
crew for specific rendition operations (according to stated requirements from the ‘end user’), positioned 
the aircraft at the start of the operation (usually in Washington), and delivered a range of logistical services 
necessary for global trips. It was Dana Priest at the Washington Post in 2004 who first revealed UK airports 
had been stop-off points for aircraft involved in rendition operations, specifically, Glasgow’s Prestwick 
airport from 2002 onwards.24   
 
Over the years that followed, the UK was quietly providing logistical support in the form of refuelling stops 
for rendition operations.25 Some details of this were revealed when two parallel intergovernmental 
investigations reported their findings: the first, led by rapporteur Giovanni Claudio Fava was established by 
the European Parliament, which formed a ‘temporary committee to investigate the presumed use of 
European countries for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners by the CIA’ (hereafter, TDIP); 
the second was established by the Council of Europe, and was led by rapporteur Dick Marty through the 
Parliamentary Assembly’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (hereafter, PACE).26 These two 
investigations confirmed many of the details of European complicity in CIA rendition and secret detention 
which had surfaced in prior investigative work and court cases. It was the Council of Europe investigation in 
particular, however, which firmly set out details of European complicity, particularly details of the transport 
of prisoners through European airspace, and European airports, including British ones, since Marty was able 
to obtain full data of flights by CIA-linked aircraft through European airspace. PACE concluded that there 
existed a ‘global spider’s web’ of rendition and secret detention involving CIA black sites, Department of 
Defense detention facilities, third country prisons, and rendition flights linking these sites.27  We now know 
that UK logistical support was far more extensive than either of the investigations was able to document, 
and furthermore, that UK involvement entailed much more than simply providing logistical support; the 
UK’s MI6 was itself orchestrating rendition operations well before any evidence emerged in the public 
domain of any UK involvement in the programme.  
 
The use of UK airports, UK territory, and UK airspace for rendition operations 
 
Following Priest’s revelations, UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw was eventually called to give evidence to the 
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee on 13 December 2005 as part of its inquiry into 
alleged abuses of detainees in the ‘War on Terror’. He stated, ‘We know of no occasion where there has 
been a rendition through UK territory, or indeed over UK territory, nor do we have any reason to believe 
that such flights have taken place without our knowledge’.28 He further stated, ‘Unless we all start to 
believe in conspiracy theories and that the officials are lying, that I am lying, that behind this there is some 
kind of secret state which is in league with some dark forces in the United States, and also let me say, we 
believe that Secretary Rice is lying, there simply is no truth in the claims that the United Kingdom has been 
involved in rendition full stop, because we have not been’.29 As we will show, well before Jack Straw gave 
evidence in 2005, UK airports had been used many times for refuelling and stop-overs by aircraft en route 
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 to, or having just completed rendition operations. Furthermore, UK intelligence authorities had in fact 
orchestrated the renditions of numerous individuals. UK intelligence agents also had full knowledge of the 
renditions of numerous British citizens.  
 
By 2012, investigators had gathered evidence which showed that UK airports had been used 210 times by 
aircraft linked to rendition operations.30 Even this did not reveal the full extent of the CIA’s reliance on the 
UK for logistical support. Recent research by The Rendition Project and Reprieve has shown that UK 
involvement in rendition from 2001-2010 was much more extensive than previously thought.31 There have 
been at least 1622 flights in and out of the UK by aircraft involved in the rendition programme. Of these, 
144 were entering UK territory while suspected of being involved in specific renditions operations, for 
refuelling en route to carry out a transfer of a prisoner, or having just delivered a prisoner from one state to 
another. 51 different UK airports were used by 84 different aircraft that have been linked to the rendition 
programme. Only the US and Canada have been used more frequently by aircraft involved in renditions 
operations.32   
 
Furthermore, evidence has also come to light that as early as January 2002, (just weeks after first being 
briefed on the CIA’s rendition programme), the UK island territory of Diego Garcia was used for the 
refuelling of aircraft involved in rendition operations. Allegations that prisoners were being transferred via 
Diego Garcia were first made in December 2008, when Human Rights Watch wrote to the Prime Minister 
about the matter. On 8 January 2003, FCO Minister Baroness Amos, in a statement to the House of Lords, 
denied that the US was holding prisoners in Diego Garcia, a claim she repeated on 28 April, and which Tony 
Blair repeated on 14 January 2004,33 Mohammed Saad Iqbal Madni was rendered from Jakarta, Indonesia 
to Egypt on 10-11 January 2002.34 He had been detained in Jakarta at the request of the CIA. He was 
transferred on board one of the CIA's own Gulfstream V jets, with the registration number N379P, and 
flown to Egypt where he was tortured for three months before being rendered again to Afghanistan, and 
then finally Guantánamo Bay. The aircraft stopped for refuelling en route between Indonesia and Egypt, 
landing on the British island of Diego Garcia with Madni on board.  
 
N379P left its home base of Johnston County Airport in the afternoon of 9 January, just several hours after 
Madni had been arrested in Jakarta. It flew first to Washington Dulles International Airport, where it stayed 
for just over an hour. It then flew direct to Cairo, landing in the middle of the night. The aircraft disappears 
from the flight records at this point, reappearing six days later on 15 January, where it leaves Cairo in the 
morning and flies to Glasgow Prestwick, Washington and then on to Johnston County, arriving just before 
midnight. Although there are no flight records documenting the whereabouts of N379P between 9-15 
January, other evidence points to this aircraft having flown from Egypt (where it had landed to pick up 
Egyptian agents) to Indonesia in order to pick up Madni, before returning to Cairo with Madni on board, 
stopping off for fuel in Diego Garcia on the way. Madni has testified that he was put onto a plane in the 
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 evening of 10 January and taken to Egypt.35 Indonesian officials speaking to the Washington Post,36 have 
stated that this aircraft was a Gulfstream V jet, matching the description of N379P. 
 
After 5-7 hours in the air, the aircraft stopped for 30 minutes, during which time he was photographed but 
kept on the plane. It then took off again, flying for a further 3-4 hours before landing in Cairo in the 
morning of 11 January. Analysis conducted by Reprieve has demonstrated that the stopover location was 
almost certainly Diego Garcia.37 This matches with the flying times provided by Madni, the distances 
involved, and the known speed of a Gulfstream V. It was also confirmed by a letter from then UK Foreign 
Secretary David Miliband to Reprieve's Director Clive Stafford Smith in February 2008, where he admitted 
that a ’plane with a detainee on board had refuelled in Diego Garcia in January 2002’.38 On 21 February, he 
also issued a Commons statement indicating that a rendition took place through Diego Garcia on two 
occasions in 2002.39 There is no other known prisoner transfer at that time whose route would have taken 
them via Diego Garcia, meaning that it is highly likely that the prisoner in question was Madni. 
 
In September 2002, the same aircraft flew completed a circuit that made several stops on the way, 
undertaking multiple renditions to transfer prisoners between several destinations, including Diego Garcia. 
Specifically, it is likely to have rendered Ramzi Binalshibh from Afghanistan to continued CIA detention in 
Morocco, and two other detainees – Hassan bin Attash and Abu Otaibi Hadarami – from Afghanistan to 
Jordan. This circuit is also likely to have involved the rendition of a prisoner from Southeast Asia to Egypt, 
via Diego Garcia.40 It is not clear from the available evidence whether this was the second of the two 
rendition operations that Miliband was referring to. Research by The Rendition Project would suggest that 
Diego Garcia was used for further renditions, including the rendition of a number of people from the Far 
East to Libya in 2004, discussed below.  
  
Orchestration of rendition operations by MI6 
 
Long before Straw gave evidence before the Foreign Affairs Select Committee in December 2005, the UK 
had been involved in the initiation of renditions from Asia to Libya. This came to light in late 2011, when on 
3 September 2011, just after the fall of the Gaddafi regime, Human Rights Watch obtained the so-called 
Tripoli documents of the Libyan intelligence chief, Musa Kusa.41  
 
The documents show that UK intelligence services initiated the rendition of Abdel Hakim Belhadj (also 
known as Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq) and his pregnant wife, Fatima Bouchar, from Bangkok to Libya, in early 
March 2004. Belhadj had left Libya in 1988 and during the 1990s became leader of the Libyan Islamic 
Fighting Group (LFIG), aimed at overthrowing Colonel Gaddafi’s regime. In early 2004, Belhadj and Bouchar 
suspected they were being monitored by the authorities, and decided to seek asylum in the UK. On 21 
February 2004 they were detained at Beijing airport and deported back to Malaysia. Afraid of being 
deported to Libya, on arrival at Kuala Lumpur Belhadj claimed that he was an Iraqi refugee and wished to 
claim refugee status. The couple were then detained and interrogated in Kuala Lumpur for two weeks. 
                                                             
35
 Reprieve, 'Ghost Detention on Diego Garcia',  20 May 2009. <http://www.reprieve.org.uk/static/downloads/Microsoft_Word_-
_2009_05_20_FAC_Submission_DG.pdf> Accessed: 26 March 2011. 
36
 Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Peter Finn, 'US Behind Secret Transfer of Terror Suspects', Washington Post, 2002. 
<http://www.infowars.com/saved%20pages/Police_state/torture_wapost.htm> Accessed: 6 March 2013. 
37
 Reprieve, 'Ghost Detention on Diego Garcia'. 
38
 David Milliband, 'Letter to Clive Stafford Smith from David Milliband, Foreign Secretary', in  (London: Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, 2008); David Milliband, 'Letter to Clive Stafford Smith from David Milliband, Foreign Secretary'. 
39
 Sir Peter Gibson, 'The Report of the Detainee Inquiry', p. 19.  
40
 For a detailed account of the September 2002 rendition circuit then included a stopover in Diego Garcia, see: 
http://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/global-rendition/the-flights/rendition-circuits/N379P-020911.html 
41
 The documents are explained in detail in a Human rights Watch Report: HRW, 'Delivered Into Enemy Hands. US-Led Abuse and 
Rendition of Opponents to Gaddafi's Libya',  2012. <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/libya0912webwcover_1.pdf> 
Accessed: 6 March 2013. 
  
The Tripoli Documents show that British Security Services knew of their detention in Malaysia and arranged 
with the Libyan and American intelligence services to render Belhadj and Bouchar back to Libya. On 1 
March, a week after the two had been sent to Malaysia, MI6 sent a fax to the office of al-Sadiq Karima, 
Head of Libyan International Relations Department, informing them of Belhadj’s detention.42 The 
Americans also were clearly aware of Belhadj’s whereabouts, perhaps tipped off by the British, and 
arranged for him and Bouchar to be rendered back to Libya. On 4 March, the CIA sent two memos to the 
Libyan security services. The first memo, Urgent Request Regarding the Extradition of Abdullah al-Sadiq 
from Malaysia, stated that the Americans were ‘working energetically with the Malaysian government to 
effect the extradition of Abdullah al-Sadiq [Belhadj] from Malaysia’, and that ‘of course, once we have 
Sadiq in custody, we will be very happy to service your debriefing requirements and we will share the 
information with you’.43 The memo went on to request that the Libyans refrain from exerting pressure on 
the Malay authorities ‘until we have custody of Sadiq’. The second memo from 4 March, Clarification 
Regarding the Rendition of Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq, made it clear that ‘our service [the CIA] is committed to 
rendering the terrorist Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq to your custody’, and that they were ‘very hopeful for a (sic) 
expeditious resolution to this matter’.44  
 
Two follow-up memos were then sent from the CIA to Libyan intelligence on 6 March. The first, Planning for 
the Capture and Rendition of Abdullah al-Sadiq, informed the Libyans that the Malay authorities were 
planning to put Belhadj and Bouchar on a commercial flight from Kuala Lumpur to London via Bangkok the 
next day, on 7 March.45 It went on to state that ‘we are planning to arrange to take control of the pair in 
Bangkok and place them on our aircraft for a flight to your country’. It also requested the presence of 
Libyan intelligence officers during the rendition.46.  The second memo from 6 March, headed Schedule for 
the Rendition of Abdullah al-Sadiq, provided ‘important information with regard to the upcoming rendition 
of LIFG leave Abdulla al-Sadiq and his wife to your custody’.47 The memo listed the flight plans for the 
rendition circuit, including an overnight in the Seychelles for which the Libyan officers accompanying the 
American team were advised to ‘have the proper documentation’. The flight plans also included a refuelling 
stopover in Diego Garcia on return from Thailand, with the detainees on board. The memo was clear that 
‘the US officers will exercise control over this operation until the detainees are remanded to your 
government in Tripoli’, and that ‘our regulations stipulate that your officers refrain from bringing weapons 
of any type, cameras, cell phones or recording devices on board the aircraft’.  
  
The rendition of Belhadj and Bouchar appears to have followed the broad plan laid out in the CIA’s memos 
to Libyan intelligence. They were released from detention in Malaysia at some point in the first week of 
March, and told they could travel to the UK. The flight they were placed on, however, stopped in Bangkok 
on the way to London, and they were both detained again in the airport’s waiting room. They were handed 
over to US agents and detained in what they believe was a secret prison in or near to the airport. The exact 
location of the facility is unclear, although it is thought to have been within the airport perimeter or close 
by.48  
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Belhadj and Bouchar were separated and report being held, interrogated and tortured in Bangkok for 
several days. On either 8 or 9 March, Belhadj and Bouchar were rendered to Libya. Analysis of flight data by 
Reprieve and The Rendition Project demonstrates that the couple were rendered on board the CIA-owned 
Boeing 737 with registration number N313P.49 Eurocontrol and Federal Aviation Administration data shows 
that this aircraft had flown from the US to Libya on 7 March, and was back in the country on 9 March, from 
where it continued onwards to conduct a second rendition (of Yunus Rahmatullah and Amanatullah 
Ali from Iraq to Afghanistan). The CIA memo headed Schedule for the Rendition of Abdullah al-Sadiq,50 both 
confirms the other sources of data and also provides details for the aircraft’s movements between 7-9 
March. According to this memo, the aircraft picked up the prisoners from Bangkok and departed at 23:30 
GMT. It then flew to the British island of Diego Garcia where it refuelled, before departing again at 05:30 
GMT and landing in Tripoli 11 hours later.  
 
On arrival in Tripoli, Belhadj and Bouchar were driven to Musa Kusa’s ‘external security’ prison in Tajoura 
(Kusa was Gaddafi’s Head of Libyan Intelligence). Bouchar was kept for a further three months, 
interrogated, psychologically tortured, and denied medical treatment for the first two months. She was 
finally released on 21 June 2004, although was not permitted to leave the country, and gave birth to her 
son on 14 July.51 Belhadj remained in Tajoura for four years. He was tortured repeatedly and held in solitary 
confinement.52 Moreover, he says that he was interrogated by American and British agents, and those from 
other European countries. In an interview with The Independent, Belhadj described being interrogated by 
three British agents over two sessions.53  
 
The involvement of British and American intelligence in the interrogations of Belhadj is corroborated by the 
Tripoli Documents. Indeed, one of the 6 March memos discussing the upcoming rendition, headed Planning 
for the Capture and Rendition of Abdullah al-Sadiq,54 is clear that providing American access to the detainee 
was to be a quid pro quo for the CIA effecting his rendition, stating that ‘we also appreciate your allowing 
our service direct access to al-Sadiq for debriefing purposes once he is in your custody’. Once Belhadj and 
Bouchar were detained in Tajoura, the CIA sent two memos seeking to arrange access for American agents. 
One memo from the CIA to Libyan intelligence, undated and untitled, discusses a proposal for the two 
services to build on their ‘nascent intelligence cooperation’ by taking ‘an additional step in cooperation 
with the establishment of a permanent CIA presence in Libya’.55 It also states that: 
 
We are also eager to work with you in the questioning of the terrorist we recently rendered to 
your country. I would like to send to Libya an additional two officers, and I would appreciate if 
they could have direct access to question this individual. Should you agree, I would like to send 
these two officers to Libya on 25 March. 
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In a separate memo, dated 17 March and headed Travel to Libya,56 the CIA made arrangements for the two 
agents to travel to the country on 25 March to ‘discuss the recent rendition’. Although the individual is not 
named in either memo, the dates discussed strongly suggest that they are referring to the rendition and 
interrogation of Belhadj. 
 
Likewise, the Tripoli Documents include a memo from Mark Allen, who was then Director of 
Counterterrorism at MI6, to his counterpart in Libya, Musa Kusa.57 Dated 18 March, it primarily discusses 
the upcoming visit by Prime Minister Tony Blair to Libya. However, it also explicitly congratulates Kusa on 
the ‘safe arrival’ of Belhadj and discusses securing direct British access to the detainee’s interrogations: 
 
Most importantly, I congratulate you on the safe arrival of Abu Abd Allah Sadiq [Belhadj]. This was the 
least we could do for you and for Libya to demonstrate the remarkable relationship we have built over 
the years. I am so glad. I was grateful to you for helping the officer we sent out last week. Abu ‘Abd 
Allah’s information on the situation in this country is of urgent importance to us. Amusingly, we got a 
request from the Americans to channel requests for information from Abu ‘Abd Allah through the 
Americans. I have no intention of doing any such thing. The intelligence on Abu ‘Abd Allah was British. I 
know I did not pay for the air cargo. But I feel I have the right to deal with you direct on this and am very 
grateful for the help you are giving us. 
 
As well as directly interrogating Belhadj, documents unearthed by The Mail on Sunday from the abandoned 
British Embassy in Tripoli and marked UK Secret include ‘long lists of questions and background intelligence 
that MI5 and MI6 asked Libyan interrogators to put to Mr Belhadj during sessions where he claims he was 
being tortured’.58  
 
In a case very similar to that of Belhadj and Bouchar, the Tripoli documents, as explained by Human Rights 
Watch, also show that MI6 initiated the rendition of Sami Mostefa al-Saadi, along with his wife and four 
children, from Hong Kong to Libya, via Bangkok, on or about 28 March 2004.59 In December 2012, having 
sued the UK government for MI6’s involvement in his rendition, al-Saadi accepted £2.23 million from UK 
government in compensation in an out of court settlement. Nevertheless the UK government, despite 
making the settlement, refused to accept any liability. The settlement does raise important questions about 
what was known by senior government officials, what evidence there is of UK involvement, the extent to 
which that involvement was sanctioned at the very top of government, and whether the settlement was 
made to prevent evidence coming out through court proceedings.60 
 
The striking thing about these cases is that very senior members of the UK intelligence services were 
heavily involved in orchestrating the rendition operations. Yet months afterwards, the UK Foreign Secretary 
categorically denied any UK involvement in rendition before the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, and no 
one was any the wiser that these operations had taken place.   
 
Intelligence sharing and failure to act on allegations of torture 
 
As well as orchestrating renditions, MI5 and MI6 interrogated numerous prisoners held by the CIA as part 
of the rendition programme in Afghanistan and Guantánamo Bay, as investigative journalist. They did little 
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 to halt the ongoing incarceration of prisoners, and in some cases, encouraging their transfer from custody 
in Afghanistan to Guantánamo Bay. These include Omar Deghayes, and the ‘Tipton Three’, Shafiq Rasul, Asif 
Iqbal, and Jamal al-Harith.61  
 
In the case of Bisher al-Rawi and Jamil el-Banna, the UK shared intelligence with the CIA and other states 
which has then be used as the basis for their rendition. The three UK residents were arrested by Gambian 
authorities on arrival in Banjul on 8 November 2002, detained and interrogated by US agents in the 
country, and then rendered to Afghanistan before being transferred to Guantánamo Bay. Jamil el-Banna is 
a Jordanian-Palestinian with refugee status in the UK. Bisher al-Rawi is an Iraqi national who had been living 
in the UK since 1984, following the detention and torture of his father by Saddam Hussein’s secret police. 
He obtained British residency in 1985, and had indefinite leave to remain in the UK. 
 
During the 1990s, al-Rawi formed a friendship with Muslim cleric Abu Qatada, now infamous for his 
protracted legal battle to evade deportation from the UK to Jordan, a case he lost in July 2013.62 In 1996, al-
Rawi was asked by Qatada to assist him as an interpreter at a meeting with British officials (al-Rawi 
assumes they were members of the police or intelligence services). In subsequent years he was called upon 
to act as a translator on an informal basis for British intelligence services. After 9/11 this relationship 
intensified, and al-Rawi became the channel of communication between MI5 and Qatada. However, 
relations between al-Rawi and the Agency became increasingly strained and ended just a few months 
before British authorities arrested Qatada in October 2002. 
 
On 1 November 2002, al-Rawi, el-Banna and Abdullah El Janoudi travelled together to Gatwick Airport on a 
business trip to meet Bisher’s brother, Wahab al-Rawi, in The Gambia. Together with another friend, Omar 
Omeri, the men had set up a joint venture to start a peanut-oil processing factory in The Gambia. However, 
the three men were arrested at the airport and detained under the Terrorism Act 2000. They were 
interrogated for four days at Paddington Police Station, with the ostensible reason for their arrest being the 
discovery of a ‘suspect electronic device’ in al-Rawi’s luggage. Indeed, classified UK Government documents 
released during the civil case brought against Jeppesen Dataplan63 in 2006 include a telegram sent by MI5 
to the CIA, dated 1 November 2002.64 This stated that al-Rawi was an ‘Islamic extremist’, and that the 
police had recovered ‘some form of home-made electronic device. Preliminary inquiries including X-ray 
suggest that it may be a timing device or could possibly be used as some part of a car-based Improvised 
Electronic Device’. The British Security Services had clearly been following the men beforehand: six days 
earlier, on his way to The Gambia, Wahab al-Rawi had been stopped and extensively questioned about the 
new business, and about Abu Qatada. Moreover, the luggage search was conducted covertly, authorised by 
a warrant signed by the Home Secretary. 
 
On or about 4 November, after four days of questioning, the men were released. The battery charger, 
which had apparently precipitated the arrest, was returned to al-Rawi. It was clear at this point that the 
device had been assessed as harmless; a position confirmed in a telegram from MI5 to MI6 and the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office on 11 November, which stated that it was ‘a commercially available battery 
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 charger that had been modified by Bisher al-Rawi in order to make it more powerful’.65 However, this 
assessment was not passed onto the CIA. Instead, on 4 November MI5 sent a telegram headed Travellers to 
Gambia, which asked the CIA to pass on the men’s travel plans to the Gambian intelligence service, and to 
communicate the Gambians’ reaction back to MI5.66 Specifically, the telegram stated that ‘We would be 
grateful for feedback on the reaction of the Gambians to this intelligence. In particular, we would be 
interested to learn if they are able to cover these individuals whilst they are in Gambia’. 
  
On 8 November, the three men attempted to travel to The Gambia for a second time (this time 
successfully). The same day, MI5 sent another telegram to the CIA, headed Individuals Travelling to 
Gambia, which provided the exact flight details, including the flight number and delayed take-off time, and 
the names and dates of birth under which the three men were travelling.67 Significantly, unlike the previous 
telegrams, this one did not include the caveat that the intelligence provided was ‘for research and analysis 
purposes only and may not be used as the basis for overt, covert or executive action’.  
 
As soon as al-Rawi, el-Banna and El Janoudi arrived in Banjul, Gambia, they were arrested by Gambian 
agents, along with Wahab al-Rawi and Omar Omeri, who had come to meet them at the airport. According 
to the heavily redacted 2007 Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) report on Rendition, there is no 
evidence that British intelligence intended the men to be arrested: 
 
It seems to us that there are a number of possible reasons why the men were initially arrested. It is 
possible that the Gambian police or border authorities at Banjul airport decided to search the men based 
on a “hunch” – something that happens routinely at customs and immigration points around the world. 
It is also possible that the Gambians broke the caveats on the intelligence shared with them [the heading 
‘for research and analysis purposes only’] and chose to take executive action. Another possibility is that 
the US authorities neglected to pass on the caveats or instigated the men’s arrest themselves. Whatever 
the reason for the men’s arrest, it is clear that it was not at the instigation of the Security Service.68 
 
Indeed, MI5 claim that they were only informed of the arrest on 10 November. The following day, they sent 
a telegram, headed Individuals Detained in Gambia, to MI6 and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.69 
This set out some background information on the men, and stated that the Service was ‘receiving updates 
from [REDACTED] regarding these detainees. We will forward any further relevant information in due 
course’. The five men were initially taken to the Gambian National Intelligence Agency (GNIA) Headquarters 
and questioned. The next morning, two Americans arrived and interrogated and photographed each of the 
men. They remained at this location for two days before being transported to what their captors referred 
to as a ‘safe house’. Al-Rawi and El Janoudi were then returned to the GNIA headquarters, and before all 
four were transported to a second ‘safe house’. There they were held in separate holding cells which were 
very small and without windows. The second safe house was controlled by Americans, and they were 
interrogated by both Americans and Gambians. 
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 Omeri was released relatively quickly, while El Janoudi was kept for 26 days and Wahab al-Rawi for 27 days. 
After a further two days, and despite habeas corpus proceedings pending in the Gambian courts, al-Rawi 
and el-Banna were driven to the airport at Banjul. Flight data and associated documentation demonstrate 
that al-Rawi and el-Banna were rendered from The Gambia to Afghanistan on 8-9 December, via refuelling 
stopover in Egypt, on board the CIA-owned Gulfstream V jet with registration number N379P. Flight 
planning services were provided by Jeppesen Dataplan, a subsidiary of Boeing Inc. which arranged the 
logistical details for numerous CIA rendition flights.70  
The UK’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) launched an inquiry into British involvement in 
rendition,71 after the PACE investigation (discussed above) published its findings in 2006.72 In its heavily 
redacted report, released in 2007, the ISC concluded that MI5 had been ‘indirectly and inadvertently’ 
involved in the rendition of two men, Bisher al-Rawi and Jail el-Banna, by passing on information about 
them to the CIA. The ISC found that the CIA had told MI5 in late November that they intended to carry out a 
‘rendition to detention’ operation to transfer the detainees to Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan. The ISC 
noted that the Security Service ‘registered strong concerns, both orally and in writing, at this suggestion 
and alerted the FCO’. In response to these representations, as well as several made at the diplomatic level, 
the Americans declined to give the precise location of the detainees, saying only that there were good 
grounds for their detention and that they were being treated well. Despite finding evidence of ‘indirect’ 
and ‘inadvertent’ involvement of the UK security services in the rendition of al-Rawi and el-Banna, the ISC 
concluded that there was no evidence that any British agency had been ‘directly involved’ in the rendition 
programme, and that they had simply been slow to catch up with what the CIA was doing.73  
 
As the cases discussed here show, including that of al-Rawi et al, the conclusions of the ISC are at odds with 
the facts on the ground. Critics argue that this can in be explained by the lack of independence of the ISC, a 
Committee which is hand-picked by the prime minister in collaboration with the two main opposition party 
leaders. This criticism was repeated when the UK government announced that the stalled Gibson Detainee 
Inquiry would be handed to the ISC in December 2013.74 A further factor was the efforts made by the UK 
government to conceal the degree of British involvement.  
 
One case that helpfully illustrates both UK complicity in rendition and UK efforts to suppress evidence of its 
involvement is that of British resident, Binyam Mohamed. On his release after years as a prisoner in the 
global rendition system, Mohamed alleged that UK intelligence agents had been present and participated in 
his interrogation, knew of his torture, and failed to act. They had also shared intelligence with foreign 
agencies about him. Mohamed is an Ethiopian national who had been legally resident in the UK since 1994. 
He had travelled to Afghanistan in the summer of 2001, supposedly in an attempt to overcome a drug 
addiction. On 10 April 2002, he was arrested in Karachi Airport, Pakistan, while attempting to return to the 
UK. Pakistani immigration officers detained Mohamed at Karachi Airport for three days. On 13 April, he was 
transferred to the Pakistani-run Landi Prison, and held for seven days. On 20 April, Mohamed was 
transferred to an interrogation centre run by Pakistani intelligence services (ICI) in Karachi, and was held 
there for three months. In July 2002, Mohamed was transferred from Pakistan to Morocco where he was 
held and repeatedly tortured until January 2004. He was subsequently transferred to CIA custody and 
rendered again, this time to the ‘Dark Prison’ near Kabul. He was subjected to further torture and 
interrogation by the CIA. He was finally taken to Guantánamo Bay in September 2004, where he remained 
until his release and return to the UK in February 2009.75 
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While in Pakistan, he was interrogated by four FBI agents, three of whom were identified as ‘Chuck’, ‘Terry’ 
and ‘Jenny’. During their interrogations of Mohamed, they threatened him with torture by foreign security 
forces. According to a declassified version of Mohamed’s testimony to his lawyer, Clive Stafford Smith 
(provided in August 2005 when Mohamed was still in Guantánamo Bay),76 the interrogator ‘Chuck’ 
threatened: ‘If you don’t talk to me, you’re going to Jordan. We can’t do what we want here, the Pakistanis 
can’t do exactly what we want them to. The Arabs will deal with you’. ‘Terry’ also threatened him with 
transfer to Israel or Jordan, and even to the British: ‘The SAS know how to deal with people like you’. When 
the Americans were not present, Mohamed was beaten repeatedly with a leather strap. At one point, a 
Pakistani pressed a gun into his chest and waited: ‘I knew I was going to die. He stood like that for five 
minutes. I looked into his eyes, and I saw my own fear reflected there. I had time to think about it. Maybe 
he will pull the trigger and I will not die, but be paralyzed. There was enough time to think the possibilities 
through.’ After that incident, ‘Chuck’ came into the room, said nothing, but just stared at Mohamed. 
 
Mohamed claims that he was also interrogated by two MI6 officers, one of whom identified as ‘John’. 
According to Mohamed: 
 
They gave me a cup of tea with a lot of sugar in it. I initially only took one. ‘No, you need a lot more. 
Where you’re going, you need a lot of sugar.’ I didn’t know exactly what he meant by this, but I figured 
he meant some poor country in Arabia. One of them did tell me I was going to get tortured by the Arabs. 
 
Mohamed’s allegations were considered as part of the 2007 ISC investigation. It concluded that MI6 had 
testified behind closed doors that it had had no contact with Mohamed at any point.77 MI5, however, did 
admit that one of its officers interrogated him while in Karachi, but ‘denies that the officer told al-Habashi 
[Mohamed] he would be tortured’. In subsequent investigations regarding UK complicity in Mohamed’s 
torture, that officer became known as Witness B. According to testimony heard by the ISC, ‘the officer 
[Witness B] reported that he did not observe any abuse and that no instances of abuse were mentioned by 
al-Habashi’.  
 
However, court documents since released demonstrate that MI5 in general – and almost certainly Witness 
B in particular – were aware of Mohamed’s mistreatment by the US in Pakistan, before Witness B travelled 
to Pakistan to interrogate him. This, Mohamed’s lawyers have argued, amounts to British complicity in his 
mistreatment. A summary of the 42 classified CIA documents handed to MI5 regarding Mohamed’s 
treatment was included in a High Court decision concerning Binyam Mohamed v Secretary of State in 
August 2008.78 However, this section of the decision – which ran to seven short paragraphs – was redacted 
from the open judgement on request by the Foreign Secretary, citing national security concerns. Further 
legal action eventually saw the decision to redact these findings overturned, and in February 2010 the 
paragraphs were released as an annex to a judgement by the Court of Appeal which dismissed an attempt 
by the Foreign Secretary to keep them classified.79 They read: 
 
It was reported [to the Court] that a new series of interviews was conducted by the United States 
authorities prior to 17 May 2002 as part of a new strategy designed by an expert interviewer. 
v) It was reported that at some stage during that further interview process by the United States 
authorities, BM [Mohamed] had been intentionally subjected to continuous sleep deprivation. The effects 
of the sleep deprivation were carefully observed. 
vi) It was reported that combined with the sleep deprivation, threats and inducements were made to 
him. His fears of being removed from United States custody and "disappearing" were played upon 
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 vii) It was reported that the stress brought about by these deliberate tactics was increased by him being 
shackled in his interviews 
viii) It was clear not only from the reports of the content of the interviews but also from the report that 
he was being kept under self-harm observation, that the interviews were having a marked effect upon 
him and causing him significant mental stress and suffering 
ix) We regret to have to conclude that the reports provided to the SyS [security services] made clear to 
anyone reading them that BM was being subjected to the treatment that we have described and the 
effect upon him of that intentional treatment 
x) The treatment reported, if had been administered on behalf of the United Kingdom, would clearly have 
been in breach of the undertakings given by the United Kingdom in 1972. Although it is not necessary for 
us to categorise the treatment reported, it could readily be contended to be at the very least cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment by the United States authorities. 
 
It should come as no surprise that the foreign secretary sought to suppress this evidence, given that when 
questioned by the Foreign Affairs Select Committee in December 2005, he had categorically denied that 
that the UK intelligence officer who saw Mohamed had observed any abuse.80 Straw’s claim proved to be 
untrue. 
 
The degree to which the intelligence services and officials have sought to suppress evidence of British 
involvement was further highlighted with the publication of the report of the stalled Gibson Inquiry into 
detainee abuse in December 2013. The Inquiry, launched by Prime Minister David Cameron in July 2010 
was controversial from the outset. Within months of its announcement, leading human rights organisations 
indicated they were concerned at the levels of secrecy that were being built in at the insistence of the UK 
intelligence agencies that were supposedly the subject of the inquiry. Specifically they were alarmed that 
there would be no independent mechanisms for determining what evidence would be made public.
81
 
Despite raising these concerns with Gibson, the Inquiry’s terms of reference failed to meet the standards 
expected by leading human rights organisations, and in August 2011, they pulled out. In particular, they 
were critical of the Inquiry for not allowed the detainees to ask questions or to see or hear evidence 
considered in secret session.
82
 The Inquiry faltered on without the involvement of the NGOs or detainees, 
and Gibson’s interim report was presented to the prime minister in the summer of 2012, but not released 
to the public until December 2013. The report consists mainly of an account of the many questions that the 
Inquiry would have wished to find answers to, had it been able to complete its work. Gibson concluded 
there was evidence that British intelligence officers were aware of mistreatment at US led detention 
facilities in Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay and at prisons in Pakistan. He also raised 27 questions that he 
argued should be asked about the involvement of government ministers and officers of MI5 and MI6 in the 
abuse of detainees. One of the most critical questions he raised was whether the UK had a deliberate or 
agreed policy of turning a blind eye to prisoner abuse and whether the UK intelligence agencies were 
willing to condone, encourage or to take advantage of rendition operations.83 Another was whether 
complete information was given to the ISC by the security services as part of its investigations.84 The 
Guardian reported that those questions had been put to the heads of MI5 and MI6, and both were given a 
month to respond, and would be reporting to the ISC.85 In March 2014, those NGOs that had pulled out of 
the Gibson Inquiry wrote to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, William Hague, 
and the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Jeremy Heywood, to question the suitability of the ISC to take the inquiry 
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 forward, given its past failures to uncover the full extent of rendition, and given the veto power held by the 
Prime Minister, meaning its inquiry could never be fully independent. They also urged the government to 
ensure that the responses to the questions put by Gibson to the heads of MI5 and MI6 be made public.86 




Successive UK governments have repeatedly claimed that they unreservedly condemn torture or other 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment, and they in no way condone or facilitate its use. 
They have also made much of their commitments to a foreign policy motivated by concerns for human 
suffering and a will to ensure freedom and security for populations subject to oppression around the globe. 
Yet the evidence shows that the UK has been involved in a whole raft of rendition-related activities that 
violate numerous obligations under international human rights law. Renditions aircraft have enjoyed 
hundreds of stopovers in dozens of UK airports. The UK has played an active role in orchestrating and 
facilitating renditions to countries where it knew there was a risk of torture, that it has actively participated 
in intelligence sharing which has led to renditions to torture, that it has encouraged intelligence agencies in 
of other states in using torture, by using them as a conduit for its own intelligence gathering activities, and 
that it has repeatedly turned a blind eye when it has witnessed torture or the effects of torture on 
detainees, or when it has been explicitly told that torture took place. The UK has repeatedly failed to report 
cases of torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment to the appropriate 
authorities, despite obligations to do so under international law. Many of these things were going on well 
before UK officials denied any UK involvement.  
 
One of the most troubling aspects of the UK’s involvement is that none of those subjected to rendition, 
facilitated by the UK’s intelligence services, have been found to have committed any terrorist acts by UK 
authorities. Furthermore, the supposed evidence in relation to them has proved extremely flimsy or non-
existent, as the secret memos between MI5, MI6 and the CIA show.  Gearty makes a compelling argument 
that the UK (and other powerful liberal democratic states) are able to get away with this to the extent that 
they do because in such states, many of us do enjoy liberty and security in fact as well as theory. 
Furthermore, because we have been drip-fed a message that our enemies are everywhere, and we face 
existential threats every single day, we are prepared to accept infringements of liberties, especially for 
others, and to a lesser extent, ourselves, yet still believe that the liberty we enjoy is a universal value.87 This 
perhaps helps explain why there is relatively little public response on these issues, and why government 
inquiries into such practices can afford to be so partial, and inadequate.  
 
Indeed, the evidence that has come to light about the UK’s role in rendition has not been the result of 
partial investigative processes launched by successive New Labour and Coalition governments. Rather, it 
has resulted from the painstaking work undertaken by human rights investigators and litigators, working on 
behalf of individuals caught up in the global rendition programme, investigative journalists, and a small 
community of academics. This is evidenced throughout this paper by the extent to which our own analysis 
draws on the investigative work they have done, the source materials they have made publicly available, 
and the research we have completed in collaboration with them. What underpins their endeavours is an 
unflinching commitment to universal human rights for all, regardless of what an individual may be 
suspected of.  Their work is crucial if we are to have any chance of holding our neo-democratic states to 
account for the unethical and secretive elements of their foreign policies, and if we are to halt the erosion 
of the universalism of rights for all.   
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